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Abstract

This thesis examines the impact of Supreme Court de

cisions affecting public administration immunity and explains
their effect on the contemporary administrative state.

In

addition, it will explore alternative methods for protecting
citizens' rights from official malfeasance.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Modern government bureaucracies are larger and more

powerful than at any time in history.

The President, members

of Congress, and private citizens have found that holding

the bureaucracy and its employees accountable for its actions
has become increasingly more difficult.

The image, however,

of unresponsive bureaucrats and an all-powerful bureaucracy
is also somewhat misleading.

The President, the Congress,

and private citizens all have methods at their disposal for

ensuring that the public service serves the public.
This thesis will analyze the impact of Supreme Court

decisions affecting public administration immunity and ex

plain their effect on the contemporary administrative state.
In addition, it will explore alternative methods for protec

ting citizens' rights from official malfeasance.
President Nixon's domination of the federal welfare

bureaucracy and the considerable changes he wrought in wel~

fare policy illustrate the power of the President to influ

ence the bureaucracy.^ Presidential appointments to civil
service positions are another example of executive control
over the federal bureaucracy.

The Congress, through control

of the budgetary process, has possibly the greatest potential
accountability mechanism of all at its disposal.

The private

citizen, however, has no comparable means at his disposal.

The individual wronged by the action of a certain public

official or agency had, until the last two decades, little

recourse.

However, recent developments concerning the civil

liability of public employees has given the individual the
right to pursue complaints in the courts.
The demand for increased accountability among public

officials and employees has been influenced by two important
— • j-i_ _ —
~-c
„4.^otive State
developments.2 First,
the rise of
the Administra

has had profound consequences for citizens in democratic

nations.^ The rapid growth of the Administrative

State has

resulted in an increase in the governmental penetration

the economic and social life of the nation.

of

In addition.

this growth in governmental activity has increased to a point
where the degree of discretion permitted government employees
has been expanded in order that these employees may perform
their duties.

Many civil servants today are considered experts in
their field, functionaries whose decisions are guided by a

specialized knowledge often not available to the

ordinary
technology

citizen.^ Moreover, in an age of ever increasing

and specialization, the degree of discretion afforded

public

officials has presented greater arguments for increased

accountability mechanisms for these officials. Elected
.s must also depend on the specialized knowledge of
the modern civil servant.

Therefore, todays civi1

servant is

not simply the executor but many times the initiator
policy.

of public

^

During the past 50 years the Congress has

Legislative Veto in its efforts to exert control

used the

and

influence over federal agencies, as well as the Executive
Branch of government.

Simply stated, the veto enabled Con

gress to delegate authority to the bureaucracy while still
being able to veto decisions or policies made by 1:he bureau
cracy when Congress felt it necessary.

However, the supreme

CoUrt, in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) V.
Chadha,

5 ^.

(1983)

■ .■ ■ ' ■ .

!■

struck down the legislative veto in a de

cision which stunned Congress.

In the main, the Court's decision will foirce Congress
to find alternative devices for holding the bureaucracy

accountable to it.
ways.

Undoubtedly, the Congress wilj. find new

This issue demonstrates, however, that in the modern

administrative state the demands for accountability are end

less, whether by the President, Congress, or an individual
citizen.,, ■

The rise of the Administrative State and the conse

quent increase in the degree of discretion afforded public
officials has left individual citizens with but one place to
turn when wronged by government employees or policy of the
courts.

According to Rosenbloom;

"allowing aggrieved

citizens to sue governmental officials affords some measure

of protection against the wrongful action of administrators
and provides the citizen with a kind of 'last ditch' defense

against the administrative state."
always possible.

However, this was not

Public officials and administrators have

traditionally enjoyed a variety of types of immunity.

Indeed,

the Constitution provides federal legislators with "privileged

;■

. ;•; ■

"

'

4'■

-I

speech" by making them absolutely iininune from suits for
damages caused by their remarks
either House,

in any speech or I debate in

and the Supreme Court has afforded;similar

protections to judges and public prosecutors.

As the ad

ministratiye state expanded, the question arose wljiether the
discretionary actions of high ranking administrative officials

ought hot to be similarly protected. The recent c^ecisions of
the courts appear to suggest not.
;

development OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

I
|

A definite trend away from administrative officials

traditional protection of absolute immunity, which was estab

lished by the supreme Courts decision in Spaldinq y. Vilas

(1896),^ and toward a more qualified immunity began to emerge
in the 1960's.

Recent decisions of the Supreme Ccjurt have

seen major changes in the personal liability of administrators

for the decisiohs and policies they formulate. A(^inistrators
at all levels of government in the United States are faced
with a growing number of personal liability lawsuits.

The

notion that those working for the sovereign can "do no wrong"
as is "true" of the sovereign, has been called into question

during the past decades.

Moreover, the range of siubject mat

ter which has come to be litigated is revolutionary in that

adlninistrative decisions which seem quite routine at first
glance are now reviewed in court.

|

The 1970's witnessed a series of attacks oh the

doctrine of absolute immunity»

These Changes came about as

a result of decisions at both federal and state Supreme Court

levels and through decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals.

Beginning with Bivens v« Six Unknown, Named Federal Narcotics
Agents (1971), and culminating with the decision in Butz v.
Economon (1978), an increasing trend towards the personal

liability of public officials has been established.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court ruled that a citizen
could sue an employee-of the federal government for monetary

damages resulting from a violation of his constitutional
rights.

This was the first reassessment of the precedents

set in Spalding v. Vilas (1896) and Barr v. Mateo (1959)

which recognized the immunity of administrative officials.
Moreover, in several cases following Bivens, the Court sub

stantially refined the nature of administrators' immunity.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974), the Supreme Court re

jected the concept of absolute administrative immunity, which
had prevailed since 1896, in favor of the notion of "quali
fied" immunity.

Whether such an immunity existed depended on

the judiciary's view of the reasonableness of the official's
judgment and the extent to which the action was taken in
good faith.

The Supreme Court, in Wood v. Strickland (.1975),

adopted a new standard for judging the scope of administra
tors' immunity.

Here, the Court ruled that public adminis

trators are not immune from liability for damages if they

"knew or reasonably should have known" that the action they
took would violate the constitutional rights of another

Together these cases set the stage for the decision in Butz

V. Economou.

The Supreme Courts decision in Butz v. Economou (1978)
dealt the final blow to the doctrine of absolute official im

munity for public administrators. In Butz, Arthur N. Economou

registered as a commodities futures trader with the Department
of Agriculture's (USDA) Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA).
The CEA was required by law to ensure that traders maintained

minimum capital balances and regularly reported their finan
cial status.

The CEA audited Economou's finances, and allegedly

found violations of the capital requirements.

As a result

the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture issued an administra

tive complaint citing Economou for failure to maintain the

minimum capital balance. Furthermore, the complaint charged
that Economou had willfully violated regulations and directed
him to show cause

why

his registration should not be sus

pended or revoked. At this time the CEA released news of
the action to the press.

A second CEA audit showed additional failures on

Economou's part to maintain the minimum capital balances.
This resulted in an amended complaint.

Formal actions by the USDA furthered the attempt to

stop Economou's trading activities. The USDA's chief hearing
examiner sustained the complaint in 1971, and the USDA s

judicial officer suspended Economou's registration for 90

days in 1973.^^
Economou appealed to the courts and the administra

tive action was stopped.

In 1974, the Second District U.S.

Court of Appeals overturned the suspension because the USDA

had proceeded against Economou without a customary warning
letter which might have led Economou to correct the financial
reserves problem.

Economou sued Butz and other USDA officials for de

priving him of his constitutional rights.

In response to

Economou's suit, Butz and the other defendants claimed
official immunity.
The U.S. District Court dismissed Economou's claim.

Federal officials, according to the court, enjoy absolute

immunity for all discretionary acts carried out within the
13

scope of their authority.

However, the U.S. Court of

Appeals held that executive officials do not have absolute
immunity.

The court based its decision on the Civil Rights

Act of 1871.

In Butz, the Supreme Court formulated new policy
which "removed the protection from personal suit and

monetary damages which federal executives had enjoyed, saying
that federal officials and employees are not absolutely

immune from liability for injuries if they deprive others
14

of their constitutionally protected rights."
The succession of cases since Butz appears not only

to confirm, but also widen the base of federal officials

liability.

Davis v. Passman (1979) held that the due pro

cess clause of the Fifth Amendment provided a remedy in

damages.

Carlson v. Green (1980) held that the Eight

Amendments cruel and nnusual punishment clause cotild also
serve as the basis for a civil suit for damages aaainst

federal officials.

Despite the fact that one case in the
TO

circuit courts, Cruz v. Beto (1980),

placed the burden of

proving a federal officials neglect or disregard :tor consti
tional rights on those allegedly injured, the need to go to
court at all shows a radical departure from past policy.

The Supreme Courts' decision in Butz overruled the oftused doctrine of official immunity as applied to federal ad
ministrative officials.

Today federal executives I can claim

only a "qualified immunity", rather than absolute;immunity,
"that immunity qualified by evidence attesting to'the exe
cutive's good faith and reasonable belief in the constitu
■ ■ ■

■■■

■ ■ 19 •

tionality or legality of his or her action."

■ '■ ■ ■

j

IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOSS OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

Increased accountability of civil servant^ is cer
tainly desired, however, not everyone appears certain that it
is desirable in heving the courts formulate administrative

malpractice policy as the best way to accomplish this.
The Butz case has several negative implications

affecting the administration of public policy.

First, the

defense of constitutional damage actions will be more diffi
- 20

cult than in the past.

■

^

Prior to Butz, the government

asserted absolute official immunity in defense of federal
officials whose discretionary acts were challenged as uncon

stitutional.

However, to establish a claim to a qualified

immunity, which is now the maximum protection available

generally to fecleral officials on constitutional claims,
the official must show that he acted reasonably and in
good faith.

!

The subjective element of good faith often

involving state of mind of the official, |
may not be possible by affidayit, as was |
done prior to Butz, but instead will fre-i

•

guently regviire a trial.^l

These trials will be more costly,, more time-consui|ning, a.nd
more difficult.

Secondly, the Butz case, as well as the succession
of section 1983 cases since Butz, have placed public officials

in a position of having to predict the constitutionality of
their discretionary actions.

In sum, a governmental officer

is charged with foreseeing the unforeseeable despite apolo
■■

■ ■'■ 22 '

getic statements of the Court to the contrary.

The decision in Butz has made the defense of consti

tutional damage actions more difficult.

In addition, it has

forced public administrators to be wary when making decisions
involving their discretion.

This may seriously hamper

officials in doihg their duty.

The ultimate outcome may

well be that officials faced with the possibility|of having
to satisfy a future jury of the reasonableness and good faith
of their actions, will simply opt for the safest course of

action, rather than acting in a more vigorous manner, "unem^

■ ■ ■'23 ■" The
'• ' ■ thteat
':
of

barrassed by the fear of damage suits."

these suits skewing the proper functioning of government may

be seen as frightening.^^

10

The question must now be raised as to whoi should for
mulate administrative malpractice policy and what; goals should
be considered.
maker so far.

The Supreme Court has played primiary policy
However, in formulating administrative mal

practice policy, the Court is capturing a function of other
25

branches.

.

.

In handling personal liability suits against

federal officials, the courts perform what is essentially a

legislative task.

Justice Rehavquist argues against assuming

Congress' place

. . . because judgments that must be made
here involve many 'competing' policies,

goals, and priorities' that are not well
suited for evaluation by the Judicial

Branch.^®

Others, including David Rosenbioom, disagree, arguing that

"the Supreme Court has responded to the rise of the adminis
trative state by affording the individual greater defenses
27

against bureaucratic power."

Whether it is Congress or the Court which will ad

dress policy regarding administrative malpractice, what
policymakers should consider is of major concern.

The

courts have basically attempted to protect citizehS from un
warranted official misconduct.

In addition, two Other

basic goals have been,addressed.

First, to compensate citi

zens injured by government officials who act illegally.

Secondly, to deter official misconduct by holding;officials
accountable in courts for damages.

The primary question about liability as policy is
"how courts can reconcile protection and compensation of

■ ' ■ '11
28 ■

individuals with deterrence and with discretion."

courts must attempt to balance these goals.

■ ■■

"The

In the meantime,

alternative remedies to the courts fashioning administrative

malpractice policy have been suggested.
One of the most frequently mentioned methods of

ensuring federal government emplpyee accountability is the
use of the eiyil Service Reform Act of 1978.

In addition,

amendmente tO;the Federal Tort Claims Act have been suggested
as an alternative method to private tort liability suits.

Both of these alternatives to pfficials' personal liability
would use the civil service system as an accountability
mechanism instead of the courts.

would accomplish two titiir^s.

It is argued that this

First, it would cut down on the

number of frivolous persohal liability Suits filed against

federal employees.

Secondly, it would provide a more effec

tive and efficient standard for regulating employee conduct.
Other alternatives which have been suggested include

administrative malpractice insurance and risk management

strategies.

So far, however, private liability insurance has
■ 29'

been all but impossible to obtain.

Risk management involves

isolating potential liability risks or activities which might
3Q .

lead to court suits.

Government operations would be sur

veyed, identifying liability risks.

This system has been

used by private enterprise but has not yet been tried by
either local, state, or federal governments.

In the recent past, the Supreme-Court has begun to

establish an administrative malpractice policy.

This policy

■'" -'V

has many supporters as \^ell as critic

■■

r2-'v

The Courts' actions are,

therefore^ still an issue of hot contention. At any rate,
"we have entered a nev/ era in which civil liability comprises

a major avenue to administrative responsibility, and awaits
the reconciliation of divergent goals in present mailpractice
■

policy.

Chapter Previews

,

^

The tradition of administrator's immunity is based on a

series of court decisions which at first established and

eventually broadened the concept of absolute administrative

immunity.

Chapter Two will examine the reasoning behind the

concept of absolute immunity and the court decisions which it
was based on.

This chapter will also review the evolution of■

the theory of administrator's liability and the policy con
siderations underlying that evolution.

In addition, it will

examine the rise of the administrative state and the conse

quent changes brought about by this growth for citizens.
A reexamination of the doctrine of absolute immunity

began in the 1970's.

Beginning with Bivens in 1971 and cul

minating in the Butz decision in 1978 the concept of absolute

immunity was replaced by the development of qualified im

munity.

Chapter'Three will'examine the demise of the theory

of absolute administrative immunity and its replacement by a

theory of qualified or limited immunity.
Chapter Four will examine the implications of the loss
of absolute immunity; for administrators, the public, and
the functioning of the administrative state.

Additionally,

13

it will examine possible alternatives to administrators'

libility as a means of ensuring administrative efficiency.
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Chapter 2

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will review the evolution'of the theory
of administrative liability and immunity and the policy consid
erations underlying that evolution. Ihe legal heritage of

liability and immunity doctrine in the United States can be
traced to English Common law.

Broadly stated, the doctrine

of official immunity rende^^s government officials "immune

from liability for their actions

duct, if performed in other

even though their con

contexts, would in itself

be unconstitutional or otherwise Contrary to criminal or civil

statute."^ This chapter demonstrates how the United States •
Supreme Court decisions up to 1970 affected public administra
tors' immunity, and explains their importance for the admin
istrative state.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The rise of the administrative state has profound con
.

2

sequences for the nature of citizens in democratxc nations.

One of the problems it presents concerns the actions available
to citizens who have been harmed by the decisions of adminis
trative officials.

Traditionally, the actions of these offi

cials have been hidden from view by "absolute immunity."

As

Frederick Mosher notes, "The accretion of specialization and

of technological and social complexity seems to be an irrever
sible trend, one that leads to increasing dependence upon the

protected, appointive public service, thrice removed from
■'

direct democracy."

3'

■

In recent years, it is generally agreed
'
■ 17

18

that non-elected, non-polltically appointed officials have
4

grown increasingly powerful.

The situation has reached the

point where many people feel that greater controls must be
imposed on these officials in order to make them more accoun

table to the public for their actions.

According to Sayre,

the staffs of executive branch agencies have
come to exercise an important share of the

;

initiative, the formulation, the bargaining/
and the deciding in the process in which
governmental decisions are taken. They are
widely acknowledged to be experts as to the
facts upon which issues are to be settled;
they are often permitted to identify author
itatively the broad alternatives available
as solutions; and they frequently are allowed
to fix the vocabulary of the formal decision.
These powers are shared and used by the
career staffs in an environment of struggle
and competition for influence, but the rela
tively nev; fact to be noted with emphasis
is that others v;ho share the powers of de
cision--the President, Congress, the poli
tical executives, the congressional comm.ittees and staffs, the interest groups,
the communications media-now rarely question
the legitimacy of the career staff spokes^
man as major participants in the competition.

Yet, as usually happens in the American political

model, a countervailing weight has emerged.

While the shift

in pov/er from elective to administrative officials was be
coming more evident, the U. S. Supreme Court was reinter

preting traditional doctrines concerning administrators'
official immunity and as a result was developing some new

protections for citizens from arbitrary and protected admin
istrative caprice.
Although the steps taken thus far are modest, they

19

aire not without significant consegusncss.

Thsy contain with~

in thsiu ths concspt that th© public official can b© h©lci p©ir

sonally accountabl© to th© citiz©nry und©r c©rtain sp©cific
g

circumstanc©s.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND OFFICIAL LIABILITY

Th© doctrin© of. sov©r©ign immunity holds that th©

gov©rnm©nt cannot b© su©d for civil damages in th© abs©nc© of
its own consent.

Th© doctrin© has its origin in English law.

However, the rationail© for the doctrine, in viev/ of th©

changes brought about by the administrative state, are quit©
perplexing. Why the doctrin© of sovereign immunity was
7

adapted to American law in the first place is quite puzzlxng.
In United States v. Lee (1882), the Supreme Court acknow
ledged that

...while the exemption of the United States

and of the several states from being_sub-_
jected as defendants to ordinary actions in
the courts has...repeatedly been asserted

here, the principle has never been dis
cussed or the reasons for it given, but it

has always been treated as an established
doctrine.

However, the Supreme Court also stated that no man in this

country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of
thB Ibw may sst the lav7 at defiance with impunity.

Considering the nature of the doctrine of sovereign

immunity/ it was only logical that the government should
surrender large portions of its immunity as it became more
involved in the citizen's everyday life.

For example, as

20

early as 1855 the federal goverhraent established the United
States Court of Claims and waived its immunity where contracts
were at issue.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946,

the federal government sacrificed even more of its immunity.

The importance of sovereign immunity has consequently been
substantially diminished over time.

Thus, a citizen who is,

harmed by negligent governmental activity or governmental
breach of contract may now have some| recourse in court.

Traditionally, howevei", if a citizen attempted to sue
an administrative official, as ah individual, for v^rongs done

in connection with that official's employment rather than

atteriipting to sue the government itself, he would encounter
a different sitution.

According to Davis,

The old common law, broadly viewed, was that

an agent was liable to a third party for his
torts, whether or not within the scope of

employment, and that as between principal

and agent, the ultimate liability rested
upon the agent, whether the tort was delib
erate or involved nothing more than
negligence.

According to this approach, a citizen could sue a public
official and recover damages for the public administrator's
torts.

However, it contained two inherent problems.

One

deals with the question of when and why administrative
officials are inutiUne from suits for civil damages; the other

concerns the issue of whether an individual can bring a suit

against a federal official for monetary damages for breach of
the individual's constitutional rights.

:

21

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO ADMINISTRATORS' IM?4UNITY

Should citizens be allowed to sue public officials?

According to RosenbloOiti, allowing citizens such rights

"gives then a last ditch defense against the administrative
state.

However, it is argued that this may not be the

most appropriate method for protecting citizens* constitu

tional rights and reducing administrative errors.

It has

long been recognized that such suits could be used in a
harassing and frivolous manner.

Many of these suxts are

filed on less than meritorious grounds.

For example, the

attorney general has been sued in his individual capacity for
damages by a private school teacher dismissed from a school
V7hich indirectly received funding from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration.

^

The President and certain mem

bers of the U.S. Senate have been sued for $20 million

dollars in damages for the alleged wrongful disposal of the
Panama Canal.

Indeed, the Constitution provides federal

legislators v/ith "privileged speech" by making them abso

lutely immune from suits for damages caused by their remarks
in "any speech or debate in either House" and the U.S.

Supreme Court has afforded similar protections to judges and
"I c

public prosecutors.

As the administrative state developed,

the question arose whether the discretionary actions of high
ranking administrative officials ought not to be similarly
■ protected.

In 1896, the issue was first addressed by the U.S.

Supreme Court in Spalding v. Vilas.

The decision in the C3se
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clearly outlined where private citizens stood in regard to
suing a federal official. , The facts of the case are as
follows.

United States Postmaster General Vilas had sent

a communication to several postmasters who were seeking a

salary increase and vrere represented by Spalding.

It

allegedly placed Spalding "before the country as a common

swindler," and brought "him into public scandal, infamy and

disgrace and injured his business."

The coirmunication also

made it clear that the postmasters did not ov7e Spalding,for

the services he had provided them.

damages in court.

Spalding then Sought

In its decision, the Supreme Court estab

lished the constitutional principle that;

In exercising the functions of his office the
head of an Executive Department, keeping
within the limits of his authority, should

not be under an apprehension that the motives
that control his official conduct may, at any

time, become the subject of inquiry in a
civil suit for damages. It would seriously

cripple the proper and effective administra
tion of public affairs as entrusted to the
executive branch of the government, if he

were subject to any such restraint.

With this ruling, federal department heads Were guaranteed

immunity from civil suits arising out of decisions they made
in their official capacity,:regardless of the motives that

may have influenced their behavior.
such a doctrine are clear.

The dangers inherent in

The opportunities for abuse and

misuse of pov;er would be greater with the federal official
iipmune from civil suit.

The Spalding decision may have been appropriate v;ith

the realities of power in the federal executive branch in

1896, but as the administrative state emerged in its modern

form, the Spalding decision is no longer logical.

The ad

ministrative state today, 86 years after the Spalding de

cision, has changed s6 radically that the traditional idea

of admihistrators V. immuhity simply cannot deal X:^ith the
enormous power exercised by the federal executive branch.
The decisiori ignores the harm that could be done by the

pov7erful administrative'officials of this day and age.
Certainly, at the very least, the public needs pro
tection from officials, such as department heads, who are

acting in bad faith.

However, restricting immunity to de

partment heads ignores the nature Of power in the administra
tive state.

Although they wield considerable influence,

political executives do not control bureaucracies in any
simple sense.

The modern bureaucracy is a large and complex

organization.

Indeed, most observers agree that, "account

ability gets lost in the shuffle somexArhere in the middle

ranges of the bureaucracy."^^ This is partly the case, as
Weber explained, because "the 'political master' finds him
self in the position of the 'dilettante' who stands opposite

the 'expert,' facing the trained official who stands within
the mahagement of administration."

In the United States,

however, there is a tendency for upper level career bureau
crats to have considerable authority and influence.

More

over, this situation is compounded by the fact that politi
cal executives have a short tenure as Well as the absence of
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a "shadow government

.

which would enable them to bOgxn

their jobs with intimate knowledge of the organizations they
are assigned to lead.

Conseguently, when one argues that

civil suits would seriously inhibit administrators from ef~

fectively doing their job, then some provision for immunity
for lower rahking administrators would also be necessary.
In Barr v. Mateo (1959) the Supreme Court addressed

the question of immunity for lower ranking administration.
Barr, the acting director of the Federal Office of Rent
Stabilization, announced his intention to suspend two em

ployees for their part in a plan for utilizing agency funds
which would have ablowed employees to take terminal leave

payments in cash and then be rehired on a temporary, though
indefinite, basis.

The plan was criticized in Congress as

"an unjustifiable raid on the federal treasury," "a new rac
■ ■ 21

ket," and as involving "criminal action."

The employees

sought damages against Barr for defamation.

The court was

unable to formulate a majority opinion.

In the end, four

justices agreed with Justice HarIan, whose grandfather had
written the court's opinion on Spalding.

HarIan stated.

We are Called upon in this case to weigh in a

particular context two considerations which
now and again come into sharp conflict - on
the one hand, the protection of the individual
citizen against pecuniary damage caused by

oppressive or malicious action on the part of
officials of the Federal Government, and on

the other, protection of the public interest
by shielding responsible governmental
.

officers against the harrassment and the in
evitable hazards of vindictive or ill-founded

damage suits brought on account of action
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taken in the exercise of their official

resppnsibiritiep. It has been thought
important that officials of the govern
ment should be free to exercise their

duties unembarrassed by the fear of

damage suits in respect of acts done in
the course of those duties - suits v/hich

would consume time and energies which would
otherwise be devoted to governmental service
and the threat of which might appreciably
inhibit the administration of policies of
government." '
Harlan concluded,

To be sure, the occasions upon v/hich the
acts of a head of a department will be pro
tected by the privilege are doubtless far

greated than in the case of an officer
with less sweeping functions. But it is
because the higher the post, the broader
the range of responsibilities and duties,
and the wider the scope of discretion it
entails.

It is not the title of his office

but the duties with which the particular

office sought to be made to respond in
damages is entrusted - the relation of the
act complained of to matters committed by
law to his control or supervision which
must provide the guide in delineating the
scope of the rule which clothes the official
acts of the executive officer with immunity

from civil defamation suits.22

If Spalding gave executive department heads immunity,
then Barr v. Mateo extended this immunity to those executive
officials below cabinet rank.

justices were quite diverse.

However, the opinions of the

Justice Black supported Harlan

on the ground that if restraints were to be placed on federal
employees' speech concerning how the government service
might be improved (whistle-blowing), these should be imposed
by congressional legislation rather than the various states

general libel laws.

On the other hand, the Barr opinion was

condemned by Chief Justice Earl Warren who said that, "...it
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has not given the slightest consideration to the interest of
the individual who is defamed.
■ ■23 ■

of his interest."

It is a complete annihilation

Justice Douglas concurred, statxng that

he was less worried about governmental performance than about
the rights of individuals.
The Barr decision led to what is referred to as the

Harlan Doctrine.
Marshall in 1804,

The court had ruled, as did Chief Justice
24

that liability can result when an execu

tive clearly acts outside his authority; but the court de
cided in this specific instance that the acting director had
authority to issue the press release.

The court, through the

Barr case, developed the doctrine that no official must stand
'■ ■ "■

■

,■

.

;. . . ■■, :

a suit for an appropriate exercise of discretion.

people considered this common sense.
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Many

The federal executives

exercise of discretionary authority can always create poten

tial losses for some and gains for others.

The executive

then cannot be held responsible every time someone is harmed,
however unfortunate the loss is.

Subsequently, the Barr de

dicsion was extended to a host of public administrators, in

cluding a deputy U.S. marshal, a district director and col
lection officer of the IRS, a claims representative of HEW,
and a secret service agent.

In conclusion, under the Spalding-Barr line of rea

soning many of the acts of administrative officials were
cloaked in immunity.

A citizen who suffered harm at the

hands of officials had no recourse in court.

There was no
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effort made to render the administrator directly accountable

to the citizen even when his actions were negligent.

It

appeared that the rights of citizens ranked second to the
welfare of the administrative state.

Although some cate

gories of public officials such as police were generally
exempt from this sort of immunity, abuses were inevitable
and the time came when the court was forced to readdress the

concept of absolute immunity.
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THE LOSS OF IMMUNITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
QUALIFIED: IMMUNITY

The Spalding-Barr doctrine granted immunity to most
.ic officials in the exercise of their official respons

ibilities.

The Supreme Court, however, began a reexamina

tion of this doctrine beginning with Bivens V. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents (1971). In its decision in this

case, "the court demonstrated its willingness to strike a
different balance between the protection of citizens from

ill-used administrative power and the functional require
ments of the administrative state.

Bivens sought $15,000 from each of the agents for
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering caused when

they broke into his apartment, handcuffed him in the presence
of his fimily, threatened the entire family with arrest,
searched the apartment, used excessive force, and subjected
him to a "visual strip search" after taking him to a federal
courthouse.

This action was accomplished in the absence of

a search or arrest warrant or probable cause.

Traditionally, Bivens' standard recourse would have

been to bring an action in tort in the state court, under pre

vailing state law, rather than to seek assignment of damages
jlation of his constitutional rights in the federal

forum.^ The Supreme Court, however, through Justice Brennan
had rejected the former approach because it failed to recog
nize the practical realities of the administrative state.
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Brennan stated:

Respondents seek to treat the relationship
between a citizen and a federal agent un

constitutionally exercising his authority as
no different from the relationship between

two private citizens. In so doing, they
ignore the fact that power, once granted,
does not disappear like a magic gift when
it is wrongfully used. An agent acting 
albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of
the United States possesses far greater

capacity for harm than an individual
trespasser exercising no authority other
than

lis own.3

As a consequence,

the court held that the suit which Bivens

brought was tiis only realistic alternative.
sue for monetary

treatment by

The right to

damages resulting from unconstitutional

public officials would not be confined to

alleged Fourth Amendments violations (freedom from unreason
able search

and seizure).

Indeed, in Passman v. Davis

(1979) the c Durt subsequently extended these so-called con
stitutional tort or Bivens actions to violations of the

Fifth Amendment.

Lower federal courts, also, have recog

nized employee personal liability for violations of the
First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Four
-■
'
-4. ■ ■
teenth Amendments.

In Bivens the Supreme Court permitted monetary damages

to be levied against federal employees.

In addition, the

Court of Appeals placed two conditions on discretionary
authority, as specified in Barr, which officials must meet
to avoid being prosecuted:

good faith and reasonable action.

Because the agents had failed to show probable cause, the
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court ruled that they had injured Bivens' rights and there
fore had acted unreasonably and in bad faith.
While the Court established that the right to sue

for monetary damages resulting from unconstitutional treat
ment by public officials would not be confined to Fourth
Amendment cases, it did not examine the issue of whether the

narcotics agents in the Bivens case possessed immunity under
the Spalding-Barr doctrine.
the Court of Appeals.

The Supreme Court left this to

This Court ruled that the agents did

lack immunity
...because we do not agree that the agents were

alleged to be engaged in the performance of the
sort of 'discretionary' acts that require the
immunity"
and

V-:-; "

...it wuld be a sorry state of affairs if an
officer had the 'discretion* to enter a

dwelling at 6:30 a.m., without a warrant
or probable cause, and make an arrest by

employing unreasonable force.^
The Appeals Court did, however, leave the door open for a

"good faith" defense based on the reasonableness of the
officials' actions at the time that they occurred.

The significance of the Supreme Court decisions, be
ginning with Bivens, lies primarily in its willingness to
strike a different balance between the desire to protect

citizens from arbitrary and capricious administrative power

and the functional requirements of the state.
stand out.

Two points

First, the immunity of federal officials was now

viewed in an entirely new dimension.

As mentioned previously,

3:3

the Spalding-Barr approach to determining discretionary
authority was hot sued in Bivens,

instead, the Court used

the circumstances as a guide to determine whether the action

the official took was reasonable or was taken in a good
faith belief that probable cause existed.

Second, the Court

implied that each right in the Constitution contains a remedy
for its violation, including a personal damage suit against

the official.^
In Bivens, the Court essentially established a new

doctrine instead of applying an empty remedy and attempting
to apply the muddled "discretionary authority" doctrine.
Therefore,violation of constitutional rights implicitly
p

, ;, '

allows a court to levy damages against the violator.
LIMITED (GOOD FAITH) IMMUNITY

Tort liability of public officials refers to a poten

ial, unreasonable interference with the interests or rights
of others.

The great number of suits brought against

-ic officials in the 1970's prompted the courts to resur
rect a one hundred year old statute, the Civil Rights Act of
1871, as a way of confronting malpractice by government
officials.

Separate legal bases serve to hold state, local and

federal officials accountable.

The Civil Rights Act of 1871

is the main legislative mandate for enforcing the liability
of state and local officials.

The statute was passed in
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reaction to Ku Klux Klan terrorism following the Civil War.
The law was directed at state officials who tolerated terrorism

aimed against politically active blacks and their sympathizers.
The law, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, and codified as Title
42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code states,

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdic
tion thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper pro

ceeding for redress.10
; The Spalding-Barr precedent was reassessed by the

Supreme Court in Bivens.

In subsequent cases. Section 1983

was used to further refine the nature of administrators' im

munity.

In Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) the Court rejected the

concept of "absolute" administrative immunity in favor of
the notion of "qualified" immunity. , In Wood v. Strickland
(1975) the Court created a new standard of immunity based on

the knov/ledge the Court feels administrators should have con

cerning the violation of a citizens constitutional rights.
The precedents set in these decisions set the stage for the
Court's most important decision concerning administrative
iramunite:

Butz v. Economou (.1978). \

Scheuer v. Rhodes dealt with the liability of the

Governor of Ohio, officers of the Ohio national guard, and
the President of Kent State University for their alleged com
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plicity in the killings of three Kent State University
students.

Representatives of the estates of the three

students, fatally shot by i-he Ohio National Guard during
demonstrations at Kent State University against the United

States invasion of Cambodia in 1970, sought damages hgainst
Governor Rhodes and other officials.

The officials, it was

alleged, had "acted either outside the scope of their respec
tive office or, if within the scope, acted in an arbitrary

manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of the office.
In addressing the immunity question, a unanimous Court
held that:

...in varying scope, a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch

of government, the variation being dependent

upon the scope of discretion and responsibili
ties of the office and all the circiamstances

as they reasonably appeared at the time of the
action on which liability is sought to be
based.

It is the existence of reasonable

grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in the light of all the circumstances, coupled
Witli good-faith belief, that affords a basis
for qualified immunity of executive officers
for acts performed in the course of official
misconduct.12

With this ruling, the court rejected the concept of
"absolute immunity for state employees, which had prevailed
since 1896, in favor of a new concept, "qualified" (good

faith) immunity.

The question of whether an immunity existed

depended on the court's view of the reasonableness of the
official's judgment, and the extent to which the action was
taken in good faith.

The Supreme Court, as it had done

earlier in Bivens, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
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for a more detailed look at the application of this approach
to the specific set of facts involved.
The following year, in Wood v. Strickland (1975) the
Supreme Court adopted a new standard for judging the scope of
administrators' immunity.

should

In sum, the Court decided that

public administrators act without adequate knowledge

of the rights of others, they can be taken to federal court
and successfully sued for monetary damages.

In the case, Peggy Strickland, a 16-year old girl, and
two tenth grade classmates in Mena, Arkansas were charged with
"spiking" the punch served at a school gathering in violation
of a school regulation prohibiting the possession or use of
alcohol at such activities.

The girls were questioned by a

teacher concerning their participation in the incident and

admitted their guilt.

The teacher convinced the girls to

tell the school principal.

The principal suspended the girls

for two weeks and referred the matter to the school board for

further consideration.

At the next school board meeting the

principal and the teacher to whom the girls had confessed
recommended leniency.

However, when it was discovered that

one of the girls had been involved in a similar incident

previously, the principal and the teacher withdrew their
recommendations for leniency and the Board decided to expel

the girls for the semester.

Two of the girls, Strickland

and Virginia Grain, brought suit against the board members
under 42 U.S. Code 1983, asserting that, in the absence of a
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full-fledged hearing^ their cqristitutional right to due pro
cess had been abridged by their expulsion.

"The girls sought

injunctiye relief, declaratory relief, and by amendnient to
their complaint, 25,000 dollars as compensatory damages for
each plaihtiff and 5,000 dollars punitive damages againSt each
'defendant."

^

V V
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the immunity issue, the majority of the

Supreme Court, through Justice White, held that both an

"objective" and "subjective" standard must be applied in
assessing the extent of official immunity:
The official himself must be acting sincerely
and with a belief that he is doing right, but
an act violating a student's constitutional

rights can be no more justified by ignorance
or disregard of settled, indisputable law on
the part of one entrusted with supervision of
students' daily lives than by the presence of
actual malice."

The court went on to hold that;

...a school board member is not immune from

liability for damages if he knew or reason
ably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of. official responsi
bility would violate the constitutional
rights of the students affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to

cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury to the student.
This created an identical standard of limited immunity

for all public officials from police officer to governor

(except for those who have absolute immunity, for example,
federal prosecutors),

Katten has called Wood "the break

ghrough in the effort to unravel the crazy guilt of immuni
ties.

The Wood ruling, however, still has a degree of

3.8

uncertainty to it.

If there is good faith, then the deter

mination of immunity based on the official's knowledge that

deprivation of rights would occur to the injured party.

The

important question is, how much knowledge is sufficient to
trigger the immunity shield?

While some claim that Wood

"changes good faith from a subjective question of what did
the official believe at the time to the objective one of what
he should have known at the time," this question has yet to
be answered by the courts.

Justices Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief

Justice Burger, dissented in the Court's creation of a new
standard of immunity, arguing that it was unreasonable for
the court to assess what the school board members "reasonably

should have known."

Justice Powell focused on the portions

of the majority opinion which held that the school board mem
bers knew of the "settled, indisputable law" and "basic, un

questioned constitutional rights." Speaking of these stand
ards of knowledge that the majority established as a predicate

to immunity. Justice Powell noted: "Presumably these are in
tended to mean the same thing, although the meaning of neither

phrase is likely to be self-evident to constitutional scholars
- much less the average school board member.

One need only

look to the decisions of the court - to our reversals, our re

cognition of evolving concepts, and the five-to-four splits 
to recognize the hazards of even informed prophecy as to what
are 'unquestioned constitutional rights.'"

Citing Goss v.
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Lopez, where the court extended due process safeguards to

temporary suspensions of students from public schools, Jus
tice Powell further noted that "most lawyers and judges wbuld

have thought, prior to that decision, that the law to the
contrary was settled, indisputable, and unquestioned."
In spite of the tremendous amount of dissent and

argument concerning the Scheuer and Wood decisions, the im
portance of this new standard for administrators' immunity ,
would be hard to overstate.

It established a new balance be

tween the needs of the individual and those of the adminis

trators, because it forces the administrator to be aware of
the fact that the constitutional and legal rights of private
individuals must be considered whenever the administrator acts,

According to Rosenbloom,

...the Wood standard goes a long way towards
guaranteeing that public officials will have
a more personal concern in the decisions
they make, which in theory, will force them
to avoid engaging in arbitrary unconstitu
tional actions vis-a-vis members of the

general public.

At the same time, however, the standard appears to be defined

well enough to prohibit a rash of unfounded lawsuits against
public officials.

The Wood approach is designed to give individual
citizens a constitutional vehicle for assuring administrative

competence through a form" of direct accountability, without
keeping the administrative state from functioning adequately.
In Barr, Justice Brennan asked, "Where does healthy adminis
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trative frankness and boldness shade into bureaucratic tyr

anny?"^° In Wood, the majority answered, where administra
tive officials act with malice or in the absence of knowledge

they should have; that is, where their inadequate knowledge
directly infringes upon the well-established rights of
"■ /
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private individuals.

The Wood decision left open the possibility that the

standard for the application of immunity it set forth might
be confined to school board members, rather than applied to
all administrative officials.

However, in subsequent cases,

the Court applied the same standard as in Wood to the super
intendent of a state hospital (O'Connor v. Donaldson, 1975)

and to prison administrators (Procunier v. Navarette, 1978).
In O'Connor, Donaldson was civilly committed as a

mental patient in a Florida state hospital in accordance with
Florida statutory provisions governing involuntary civil com
mitment.

Donaldson remained there for 15 years, constantly

seeking his release, arguing that he was dangerous to no one,
was not mentally ill, and that even if he were dangerous or

mentally ill, he was not receiving any type of treatment for
these conditions.

Donaldson sued O'Connor under 42 U.S. Code

1983 charging that O'Connor, the superintendant of the

hospital, had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of
his constitutional right to liberty.

At the trial, evidence

showed that Donaldson was not dangerous to others, hot

mentally ill and was not receiving treatment for his supposed
illnesses.

O'Connor's defense was predicated on a good faith
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immunity from damages inasmuch as he believed the state
statute validly authorized indefinite custodial confinement
of the mentally ill even if they were not given treatment.

Th0 judge found 0'Gonnpr guiIty and awarded Donaldson $38,500
compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages.

ThO court

•of appeals decision predicated O'Connor's liability on the
constitutional impermissibility of keeping a person civilly
committed in the absence of a showing of dangerousness to him
self or others, a right previously not recognized by the
courts.

It also held that regardless of the grounds for civil

commitment, a person had a constitutional right to treatment
for his illness.
Court stood;

O'Connor left no question as to where the

"...a state officer could be charged with fore

seeing the unforeseeable despite apologetic statements of the
Court to the contrary."
Butz V. Economou (1978)

The Spalding-Barr precedents held that federal execu

tives were not personally liable for actions taken in the per
formance of their duties even if the actions violated an in

dividuals constitutional rights.

In Bivens, however, the Sup

reme Court held federal narcotics agents personally liable
for actions which violated the defendants constitutional rights

The Supreme Court decision in Butz explains and spells
out the Bivens criteria and then applies them to a larger
class of federal officials.

In Butz, the Court placed

federal executives personal liability squarely within the pre
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cedents set in Scheuer and Wood.

These section 1983 pre

cedents provide "greater detail for identifying a constitu

tional rights deprivation" and "for applying Court-mandated
principles in determining good faith and reasonable action

in a given set of circumstances."

Most importantly, Butz

has expanded the number and type of administrators whose

immunity is no longer considered absolute.

Following Butz,

the Supreme Court established an "absolute" immunity for
administrative officials exercising adjudicatory roles, in

cluding hearing examiners, administrative law judges, and
agency attorneys exercising prosecutional functions.

Thus,

the Court decided that only where immunity is essential to
the proper performance of the job is one granted "absolute"
immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision stemmed from action
involving Arthur N. Economou, a commodities futures trader

with the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Commodity Ex
change Authority (CEA), and Earl Butz, then Secretary of Agri
culture.

The law required the CEA to ensure that traders

maintained minimum capital balances and regularly reported
their financial status.

A Department of Agriculture (DOA)

audit showed that Economou had not maintained the minimum

financial reserves prescribed by the department.

As a result,

the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture issued an administra
tive complaint citing Economou for failing to comply with
regulations.

Furthermore the complaint charged that Economou
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had willfully violated these regulations.

Economou was then

ordered to show cause why his registration should not be

suspended or revoked.

It was at this time that the CEA re

leased news of the action to the press.

A subsequent CEA audit revealed additional failures
on Economou * s part to maintain the minimum capital balances.
The second audit resulted in an amended complaint.

As a

result, the DOA issued an administrative complaint to

"suspend or revoke" Economou's registration.

The DOA's

chief hearing examiner sustained the department's complaint,
The DOA's chief legal officer later affirmed the hearing
examiner's decision a:nd suspended Economou's registration
for 90 days in 1973.
Economou asked for review, and the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the depart
ment's enforcement order.

The Court's decision was based

upon the lack of a customary warning letter which might have
led Economou to correct the financial reserves problems.

Without the customary warning letter, any finding of "will
fullness" on Economou's part, was found to be erroneous by
the court.

It was at this point that Economou sued Butz, the

hearing examiner, the department's chief legal officers, and
others "personally" for depriving him of his constitutional

rights.

Economou, who argued that he had ceased trading

before the original complaint, essentially charged that

Ad

officials took property froin him > his right to trade 
without a warning letter.

He contended i, among other things,

that the USDA had knowingly

issued deceptive and false

preSs releases that had ruined his business V

,

The press re

leases, he said, were in retaliation for his outspoken

criticism of the CEA an4 his efforts to push reform of the

agency *s procedures.

Moreover, Economou claimed that the

DOA officials initiated the trading suspension to "chill"

his First Amendment, free expression rights since he had been
• '.v ■

■
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a vocal critic of DOA commodity policymakers.
Butz, and the other dependents claimed official im

munity.

They argued that action against Economou was with

in their discretionary authority as department officials.
The DOA officials relied on what they thought was settled
law and invoked the doctrine of "discretionary duties",

which they claimed satisfied the prerequisite for gaining
protection against personal suit.

The defendants claimed

that only when an executive has "ministerial" duties or

tightly defined duties which grant no leeway in making de
cisions, could they lose the protective immunity.
:

The U.S. District court dismissed Economou's claim,

stating that federal officials enjoy absolute immunity for ; :
all discretionary acts carried out within the scope of their

On appeal the court held that executive officials

do not have absolute immunity.

The court based its deGislbn
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on the Civil Rights^ A^

of 1871.

The Court of Appeals held

that the defendants were entitled only to a qualified im

munity, which would be available only if they established

that they had acted reasonabiy en'^ in good faith.

In so

doing, the court of appeals refused to extend the absolute

immunity, available to judges and prosecutors in the judi

cial system, to their administrative counterparts, adminis
trative law judges and examiners.
Supreme Court Action ,
Butz and the other defendants appealed to the U.S.

Supreme Court.

They again argued that "they were absolutely

immune from any liability for damages even if in the course

of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed /Economou's/
constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing
and deliberate.

They contended that the broad immunity

was settled federal law.

claim as "unsound".

The court dismissed the defendant's

Moreover, the court pointed out that ,

the general rule has been that "a federal official may not

with impunity ignore the limitation which the controlling
law has placed on his powers".

The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
White, removed the protection from personal suit and mone

tary damages which federal executives had enjoyed, saying
that federal officials and employees are not absolutely

immune from liability for injuries, if they deprive a person
of his constitutionally protected rights.

■ ■
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Finally, the Butz case clearly sets new limits on
the defenses available to officials, in particular high

ranking federal officials.

In overturning the status quo

allowing officials with discretionary authority an absolute

immunity, the Supreme Court has forced officials to consider

more closely the decisions they make because they may be
forced to defend themselves in court.

Although at least one

case in the circuit courts, Cruz v. Beto (1980), has placed

the burden of proving a federal official's neglect or dis

regard for constitutional rights on those allegedly injured,
the ability to go to court at all presents a revolutionary

change, forcing administrative officials to place official
liability high on their list of priorities.
Post Butz Judicial Activity
The succession of cases since the Butz decision has

confirmed and even widened the concept of public official's

personal liability.

In Butz, an individual damage action

against officials of the Department of Agriculture was the

only avenue of relief available to Economou.

In Davis v«

Passman (1979), a sex discrimination case, the court held

that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provided

a remedy in damages.

Davis v. Passman was similar to Butz

in that the court viewed an individual damage action as the

only means for satisfactorily solving the problem.

This

factor appeared to be crucial to the court's decision to
grant relief against the individual defendant under the due
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process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

This led to the

belief that the court was using the absence of an alternative

form of adequate relief as a prerequisite for a claim of in
dividual liability.

In 1980, however, the court, in Carlson v. Green

held that the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause could also serve as a basis for a civil suit for dam

ages against federal officials.

In so doing, the court re

iterated the principles set forth in

despite the fact

that ah alternative (the Federal Tort Claims Act) was avail

able to the injured party.

In Carlson v. Green (1980), the

mother of an inmate who had died while in prison brought an

individual damage suit against federal prison officials

claiming that they had provided grossly inadequate medical
care for her son.

The claim could have been settled under the Tort

Claims Act, but the Court held that a personal damage suit

was proper.

The Court stressed that the prospect of per

sonal liability acted as a strong deterrent because the

threat of personal liability suits would discourage federal

officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct.

More

over, the Court noted that a personal damage action afforded

greater relief to individuals who had suffered constitutional
injuries because punitive damages and jury trials, which are
not generally available, were authorized.

32 .
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Chapter 4
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCE OF
THE PERSONAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS

The most I significant argument in favor of the personal
liability of publie officials is that the constitutional
rights of the nation's citizens are more important than any
of the arguments I against officials* personal liability.

In

addition, the poWer of the administrative officials has
occurred, so that a greater form Of accountability is neces

sary. Finally, |t is argued that making public administrators
personally liable for their actions will help deter these

administrators fipom acting in haste or using poor judgment in

decision making. I In other words, personal liability will
help reduce errors made by public administrator's.
In the interest of protecting individual citizens'

rights the Court;has turned its attention to the traditional
law regarding the immunity of administrative officials and

altered it, thus!allowing injured persons to recover damages
from individual administrators under certain conditions.

This

system of reliefjhas not changed agency decisions or pro
cedures but still allows citizens who have been wrongly

harmed to seek sL'tisfaction through the Court system. While
■the price of thik approach has beeh paid in the coin of in
'

'

i■

■ .

■

■ '

' .

■

creased.case loads on the already crowded dockets and, some

times, in ambiguity that makes administrative action
difficult, in the area of immunity the court has contributed

to the premise that "the sovereign of this Nation is the

people, not the bureaucracy," by protecting the former without
'

sr' ■ ■■ ■
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crippling the latter.

In a<3ditioh, many people are concerned with how, in

the face of increasing bureaucratic power and influence,
the citizen can ensure responsible administrative behavior

by public officia|ls as they carry out their tasks as ser
vants Of the people.

It is generally agreed that the people

want their public servants to act in innovative and imagina
tive ways in using discretion to implement public policies
that serve the public interest.

However, the public official

must first consider the individual.

The citizen must be

protected against actions by public officials who disregard
the person's basic constitutional rights.

According to Ball,

"in this balancing effort it must not be forgotten that

■

■ ■■

. "■

.

' ■ „2

the citizen, not the public servant, is sovereign."

Finally, it is argued that holding public officials
personally liable for their actions serves as a deterrent to
unconstitutional behavior and bureaucratic mistakes.

For

example, in Butz, the court espoused qualified immunity as a
deterrent to wrongdoing, a method for preventing federal

executives from discharging their duties with impunity or
"in a manner which they should know transgresses a clearly
established constitutional rule."

This holds true for state

and local administrators as well because the Butz decision

places the law of immunity for federal officials alongside
that of state and local officials, whose past experiences

should give insight into the significance of the Butz
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decision for federal officials.

In conclusion, it is clear that the courts have made

allowances for mistakes in judgment by public officials.

However, the emphasis places oh the protection of citizen's
rights remains equally clear*

Officials have to consider the

possibility that if they disciiminate in their decisions,
they may be held personally liable and be successfully sued

in court.

According to Rabin, "executives must add the area

of personal liability to the ever-increasing list of subjects
.,4

requiring their personal attention and training.

The past decade has seen a great increase in the per

sonal liability of local, state, and federal officials.

However, it can be argued that holding public administrators
personally liable for decisions is not the most effective
way to solve the problems that it is intended to solve.
Moreover, it is possible that this system could create serious
problems for the effective operation of the administrative
state.

There are significant problems connected with public

administrator's personal liability.

First, will the citizen's

constitutional rights be protected?

Second, will the offi

cials liability policy reduce the effective administration of

government policies?
misconduct?

Third, will the policy deter official

In conclusion, is holding officials personally

liable for their

actions in the public interest?

examine each of the questions individually.

Let us
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Will citizens' rights be protected?: It appears that

the official liability policy does reduce the ohanee

risky

decisions being nade which cannot be defended with evidenGe

of good faith and reasohableness.

The Court firmly believes

that litigation will tiean protection.

The Cpurt has ru

against officiaie in cases involvihg the Fourth^ Fifth, and

Eighth amendment^ while leaving the pessibility open fQt
suits involving the rest of t^ first

^ How

ever, little evidence is available which suggests that V
citizens' rights are of greater concern today than before or
vice versa.

One

point does seem clear though;

the victims

of uncdnstitutiojiai actions benefit little. Not only do most
public employees lack the financial resources to pay a judg
ment, but they also can defend most actions by asserting qua
lified immunity.j According to Dolan, "an employee proving

that his actions! were taken in good faith can escape liability

- a point of lav7' that explains that paucity of plaintiff re
coveries in Bivens actions."

Moreover, in the case of

federal employees, the government can defend itself in Tort
Claims Act suits by asserting the good faith of its employees.
In view of the fact that' few public iempldyees can pa^^

stantial judgment, it seems highly debatable that the consti
tutional rights of citizens are better protected because of
recent court decisions holding public officials personally
liable for their actions.

Will the official liability policy reduce the effec
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tive administration pf government policies?

Goinirion sensp

leads one to believe that the threat of damage suits will make

officials more careful in their decision making.

However, it

may have an additional, perverse effect as well.

As Judge

Learned Hand observed in 1949, the fear of personal liability

may "dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or most

irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
In today's judicial climate it is most probable that the types
Of litigation will increase.

Hence, it is possible that the

problem of public officials backing off from risky, yet many
times necessary, decision making will also increase.

Worse

still, as the Court argued in another context.

The most capable candidates for the public
service might be deterred from seeking
office if heavy burdens upon their private
resources from monetary liability were a

likely prospect during their tenure.^
The recent decisions of the court may inhibit the

effectiveness and efficiency of the public services.

It is

argued some that the ultimate outcome of official's liability

may well be, that officials, faced with the possibility of
having to defend their many actions against the accusation of

acting in bad faith, will simply opt for the safest courses
of action,' ratheir than acting fearlessly and vigorously,
7 ^

"unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits.

Will officials' liability deter official misconduct?

Again it would appear that the threat of having to defend
oneself against a damage suit would have a deterrent value.
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The personal liability case carries with it a double threat;
punitive damages-financial penalties designed solely to

punish, as well as damages collected to compensate the victim
for injury.

Somee empirical evidence suggests that tort reme

dies have been eJEfective without adverse side effects in con

8'
trolling police behavior in Toronto.
However, the deterrent
value of the personal liability policy depends on the pro
bability that a jury will award damages.

Evidence regarding

this subject is, as yet, sparse at best.
■

Many havre argued that the threat of personal liability

:ionable method for deterring official miscon
suits is a quest
duct.

There are several reasons for this.

As mentioned be

fore the method will have little deterrent value if juries

fail to grant adequate settlements.

Only the certainty of

an adequate settlement will work as a deterrent.

Other

methods of punishment, for instance, the threat of deductions

in pay, reprimand, suspension pr dismissal have been suggested
as better methods of deterrence.

Moreover, the Court has

created a situation which may further complicate the deterrent

value of personal liability.

The Court has not placed a

limit on the Constitutional amendments under which public ad
ministrators are liable to be sued.

This "open forum" that

the Court now seems willing to provide will undoubtedly also

create uncertainty which will limit perspnal liability's
deterrent effect.

This situation heeds to be clarified because,

as Miller states, "how can an act, not a constitutional vio
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lation when committed, be deterred?"
Finally, the vague

terms which havel been used by the Court lend very little guid
ance to public administrators as they attempt to carry out

publiG policy in the manner they determine to be best.
At this point it appears that there is insufficient
evidence to determine whether or not personal liability suits

will help to attain the goals of the current malpractice

policy.

The current trend toward the protection of citizen's

constitutional rights may diminish public administrators' dis
cretion.

ance.
party.

It may not act as a deterrent to official malfeas

Compensation may not be satisfactory to the injured
At this point, only time will tell.
ALTERNATIVES TO PERSONAL LIABILITY

It is readily apparent that the current trend toward

increasing the personal liability of public administrators at
the local, state, and federal levels will continue.

It has

also, however, been suggested that this method may be unac

ceptable as a way of protecting citizen's constitutional
rights without crippling or, at the least, hindering the
effective administration of the state.

The growing number of

suits had prompted a resort to personal liability insurance

among certain federal officials (after the Butz decision),
but this type of insurance is now almost impossible to find,
due mainly to court ambiguity, and very expensive to

^

maintaih. bven|with insurance, it could be argued that
officials would|be more reluctant to make decisions v/hich
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involve the risk!of a suit.

Moreover, the malpractice in

surance system h^s not been without its problems in other

professions, most notably the medical profession.
More and more people have recently suggested that

certain alternatives to the personal liability of public

administrators might possibly better meet the concerns
addressed by the Gourt in Butz, Bivens, and the remainder of

important couri^^^^^^b^^
policy.

have brought about current

One such suggestion has led.the Department of Justice

to propose legisjlation to amend the federal Tort Claims Act.
Another suggestibn has been for the implementation of error-

reducing or riskj-management strategies by public agencies.
Finally, it has been argued that professional competency is

the best defense| against the threat of personal liability
:suits. ■ ■ ■

■

Recently proposed amendments to the Federal Tort

Claims Act may j^rovide an alternative method to the personal
liability dilemma of federal employees.

The Department of

Justice estimates that several thousand so-called Biven's

suits have been jfiled since 1971.^^ Many of these suits are
filed on less than meritorious grounds.

Federal employees,

however, are noi exposed to civil liability only through
Biven's suits.

The Federal Tort Claims Act also waives the

government's so\?ereign immunity for tort claims based on the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of a federal employee

while acting within the scope of his office or employment.

,
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Although: the current Tort Claims Act does not cover
unconstitutional torts, a 1974 amendment extended the sta

tute's provisiohs to: "acts or; omissions of investigative
or law enforcemeint officers of the United States Government
/based on claims/ arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, fdlse arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
12 I
' .
prosecution." | Except for certain special situations, how

ever, (mostly, involving drivers of goverment vehicles or
certain federal physicians), nothing in the Tort Claims Act

prevents citizeils from bringing suit against the federal
employee himself or as co-defendant with the government.

Although only seven of the several thousand Bivens
actions have ever resulted in a judgment against the federal

employee, (and Six of these seven cases are in varying

stages of appeal) the morale of the public service has
I
■
13 ■ ■ '
nevertheless suffered.
stitutional

In addition, the victims of con

toirts benefit little from the current laws be

cause most federal employees lack the financial resources to
pay any judgment.
Therefore, it can be argued that the current law

makes little sense.

The limited number of provisions making

the government |the exclusive defendant in Tort Claims Act,
cases presents inany inequities.

For example, the driver of

a negligently driven government vehicle cannot be sued, but
the President can be exposed to personal liability for an act
of state such as transferring control of the Panama Canal.
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Employees can bo personally sued for the wrongful seizure of

any item except, for some inexplicable reasons, a sea-going
vessel.

j

One obvious solution to this problem would be to make
the U.S. government the exclusive defendant for both the

constitutional a|hd common law torts of its emplpyees.

In

three of the last four Congresses the Department of Justice
has proposed such an amendment to the Tort Claims Act, to no
avail. - , ^

'

M- . ■ .

The proposal made to the 96th Congress would make

the government tlhe exclusive defendant in common law tort
cases and expand the Tort Claims Act to cover constitutional

torts., If an employee was acting within the scope of his

office or emploipnent when the constitutional tort Was commit
ted, the United jstates would be the exclusive defendant. If
the ^ployee was not acting within the scope of his office,
but was acting under the color of his office When the con

stitutional tort was coiknitted, the plaintiff could elect to
sue either the United States or the individual employee.

The

government could not assert the qualified immunity of its

employees as a 4®f®nse to constitutional tort suits.
The disciplinary proceeding proposal has proved to
be the most controversial part of the legislation.

The

Department of Justice has proposed that the victim of a con

stitutional tort be authorized to initiate an agency inquiry
into the actions of the offending employee if the victim has

■ ■ ■

has obtained a monetary recovery agaihst the United States or

if he/she has aqtually filed a tort action against the United
1 C

States.

A disciplinary hearing would be required xf there

were a materialiand substantial dispute of fact which could
be resolved with sufficient accuracy only by the introduction
of reliable evidence and the decision of the agency were
■■ I
' 16 ■

likely to depend On the resolution of such dispute.

A com

plainant who ha4 actually recovered damages against the gov
ernment on the constitution tort claim would have the right

of administrative review of the disciplinary action by, in

most cases, the|Merit System Protection Board.

Judicial

review would be| taken by the appropriate United States Court
of Appeals.

The American Civil Liberties Union and Public

Citizen represe|nt general public interest groups which argue,
with justificatiion, that if federal employees are in effect
to be immunizedi from suit, they should be exposed to some

type of accountability mechanism that provides for citizen

participation. | Employee groups, however, are reluctant to
allow non-gover|nment persons to participate in inquiries into
employee conduct;

Finally, the new legislation would raise the extent

of civil liability the government will be exposed to.

Ob

viously, if th# government is to absorb the liability of its
employees, it will have to increase its liability exposure.

Consequently, the number of monetary recoveries against the
government will also increase.

Yet, the legislation to amend

the Federal Tort Claims Act may provide a more effective solu
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tion to the dilepuna of administrators liability and adminis
trative efficiency.

One poss|ible solution to the personal liability
problem which ha|s yet to be explored by any branch of the
government is rijsk-management.

A risk-management program pro

vides a systematic effort for dealing with public liability

exposures. Offi|cials can initiate the management of lia
bility risks witih the adoption and announcement of a personal

liability polici^.
An organization which is concerned about liability
risks should have a coordinating unit responsible for risk-

management, everi if it lacks a formal policy.

The Department

of Justice has t|.his responsibility in the federal government.
Other options mijght include a unit within the Office Of Man
agement and Budget or the Office of Personnel Management, or

a more decentralized, departmentalized approach.
State arid local governments, like the federal govern

ment, have no coordinating risk-management unit.

Business

and industry, h(iwever, have had much success with their risk
management units.

It has been argued that, perhaps, the

private sector with a profit motive is more concerned with

protecting their resources and that the public sector should
have similar concerns.

The first step in initiating the risk management pro

cess is to isolate potential liability risks.

Almost every

activity can conceivably lead to liability suits.

To identify
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liability risks,: government operations should be surveyed.
Federal officials might look at trends applicable to state

and local officiais' liability under 42 U.S. Code 1983.

An

awareness of potjential risks can be used to explore further
which managemenii practices might create or increase the risk
■}

of liability.

Officials can then determine the frequency and

fihancial risks|of potential Wits in an effort to measure
liability risksy

Complete and accurate records can be main

tained td determine the frequency and financial impact of the

various stilts. |This type of data base can be used to reduce
errors and suits. :

Beyond identifying and controlling some risks,

management efforts can reduce the chance of future liability
suits.

Three methods appear feasible:

constructing sound

practices for dealing with areas which create potential risks

or ones chronically creating loss; training employees in new

rules and procedures; and monitoring compliance with the pro
cedures so that early indicators of errant behavior surface

quickly and lead to corrective action—-a type of feedback

■
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system.

■ I

■

■ "' •

Finally, the federal government conducts little

training on personal liability risks while placing great
emphasis on rules and procedures to structure decisions.

Of

course, rules can exclude legally required behavior as well
.' i

as exclude legally permissible behavior.

TO

Thus, the lack
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of training on t:his topic v indicates possible areas for reform.

There is no perfject method for protecting both a citizen's
cohstitutidhal^

and a public employee against the

threat of personal liability suits.

However, administrators

can build a natural buffer against personal liability when
they carry out their duties in good faith, act in a reasonable

and judicious malnner, and base their decisions on their skills

and training. |
CONCliUSION;

THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE

The demhnd for increased accountability of public
officials and employees during the past decade suggests grow

ing concern amoijig citizens and elected officials alike with
the greater siz4 and power of modern bureaucracies. The rise
of the administrative State as well as the greater degree of
discretion afforded government employees has forced Congress,

the president, and individual citizens to make substantial
adjustments in Ithe face of bureaucratic power.

The indivi^

dual's cause hap so far been championed almost exclusively by
the various courts, and in particular by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's response to the rise of the administrative
state has been in the form of a succession of decisions which

have replaced the theory of absolute immunity of public

officials with [the theory of qualified or limited immunity.

In altering the traditional laW regarding the im
munity of administrative officials, the Court has presented

unconstitutibnailiy injured persons an opportunity to recover

5.5

damageis from the individual agents of the administrative state
■'I '

' ■
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under certain cqnditions.

^ ^ ■

In this way, the Supreme Court

has allowed citizens to confront bureaucratic power directly

by affording individuals an opportunity to successfully

oppose administfators in court. This approach has increased
case loads in already crowded courtrooms and arguably made

administrative 4'^tion somewhat more difficult, however, it
has also given the individual citizen a way in which to de
fend his or her!constitutional rights against ill-used
bureaucratic power.

Public Administration has entered a riew era in Which

civil liabilityI comprises a major avenue of administrative

responsibility.i The past decade witnessed the emergence of
the theory of qualified immunity to replace the theory of
absolute immunity.

Perhaps the next decade will witness

practical efforts for implementing the Court's new approach

by making it easier and less expensive to bring suit against
administrative bfficials while ihsuring that the citizen's
Victories are not empty because of minimal judgments or

administrators linability to pay.

Or perhaps a mOre effective

system of protejcting individual's constitutional rights while

at the same tiitje insuring the smooth running of the adminis
trative state may be found.
■ will'-,tell.''

■■r'

Only research on the issues
■■ ■

1
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Ghapter 4 Footnotes
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Jack Rabin^ Gerald J. Miller, and W. Bartley Hildreth,

"Suing Federal Executives For Damages",
(Spring 1978): 54.
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'^Ibid., p. 54.
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